The Change in corporate transparency of Korean firms after the Asian financial crisis: An analysis using analysts' forecast data by CHANG, Jinho et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
11-2007
The Change in corporate transparency of Korean
firms after the Asian financial crisis: An analysis
using analysts' forecast data
Jinho CHANG
Young Jun CHO
Singapore Management University, yjcho@smu.edu.sg
Hyun-Han SHIN
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00637.x
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the
Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CHANG, Jinho; CHO, Young Jun; and SHIN, Hyun-Han. The Change in corporate transparency of Korean firms after the Asian
financial crisis: An analysis using analysts' forecast data. (2007). Corporate Governance: An International Review. 15, (6), 1144-1167.
Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1572
The Change in Corporate
Transparency of Korean Firms After
the Asian Financial Crisis: an analysis
using analysts’ forecast data
Jinho Chang*, Young Jun Cho and Hyun-Han Shin
Using analysts’ forecast error and forecast dispersion of ﬁrms covered by the I/B/E/S database,
this study examines the change in information asymmetry of Korean ﬁrms around the ﬁnancial
crisis of 1997. Results show that the information asymmetry of Korean ﬁrms is lower after the
ﬁnancial crisis than before, implying that corporate transparency did, in effect, improve with
the change in business environment. In addition, this study ﬁnds that chaebol ﬁrms have
higher information asymmetry than non-chaebol ﬁrm, and also that the corporate transparency
improvement of chaebol ﬁrms is not higher than that of non-chaebol ﬁrms in the post-crisis
period despite the reforms particularly targeted to chaebol ﬁrms after the ﬁnancial crisis.
Keywords: Asian ﬁnancial crisis, analyst forecast error, analyst forecast dispersion, chaebol,
information asymmetry, corporate transparency
1. Introduction
W hen information asymmetry between aﬁrm and its market is high, it is difﬁcult
for the market to evaluate or predict the perfor-
mance of the ﬁrm. This increases uncertainty
about the ﬁrm, thus decreasing its credibility in
the market. Hence, as the market knows little
about the ﬁrm, investors lose conﬁdence as to
whether to invest in a new project of the ﬁrm,
increasing that project’s ﬁnancing costs (Healy
et al., 1995; Nanda and Narayanan, 1997;
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).1 This
is because ﬁrms depend more on stock sales
than bank loans or reserved cash when ﬁnanc-
ing a project, which increases the burden of
such ﬁnancing to the degree that the ﬁrms
themselves must persuade investors in the
market, ﬁrst hand (Myers and Majluf, 1984;
Krishnaswami et al., 1998).2 Voluntary disclo-
sures, therefore, such as investor relations,
become a kind of strategic behaviour of ﬁrms to
reduce ﬁnancing costs by mitigating informa-
tion asymmetry (Merton, 1987; Barry and
Brown, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Lang
and Lundholm, 1996).3
Before the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997,
Korean ﬁrms under the government-driven
development policy were not particularly moti-
vated to dissipate uncertainty or to increase
their credibility in eyes of the stock market.
Distorting the market mechanism, for example,
the Korean government provided various
supports and subsidies to ﬁrms acting in line
with its export-oriented development policies
(Chang and Hong, 2000). Speciﬁcally, as a
major stockholder in several national commer-
cial banks, the Korean government exercised
tight control over loans, dispensing low-
interest loans to ﬁrms in export sectors and
in strategic industries. Under these circum-
stances, such ﬁrms could easily access bank
loans based on government policies, reducing
the need to persuade investors with the release
of transparent information.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
identiﬁes both the low transparency and the
poor corporate governance of Korean ﬁrms as
primary causes of the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis in
Korea (Yoo, 2000; Joo et al., 2000). Kim (2000)
ﬁnds low ﬁrm transparency, in particular, to
have caused a loss of conﬁdence among foreign
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investors, subsequently triggering the rapid
capital outﬂows that brought on the ﬁnancial
crisis. Since that time, and due to the demands
of the IMF, the Korean government has under-
taken a series of structural and institutional
changes within the business environment that
are thought to have created more incentives
for Korean ﬁrms to mitigate their information
asymmetry. By developing the stock market,
for example, as well as reinforcing the global
rights of shareholders, ﬁrms were provided
with far-reaching incentives to reduce their
information asymmetry. Ultimately, Korean
ﬁrms began to realise the importance of prac-
ticing transparency, or credibility, in capital
markets. Nonetheless, there are no empirical
studies that investigate whether the overall
changes in the Korean business environment
after the ﬁnancial crisis effectively contributed
to a decrease in information asymmetry, as
prior studies have only addressed the value
relevance of accounting information during
the economic shock.4 However, such a study is
particularly important because it can lead us to
understand how economic shock affects the
information environment of ﬁrms.
In this vein, this study examines whether
the information asymmetry around Korean
ﬁrms was effectively reduced following the
ﬁnancial crisis. Information asymmetry, an
imposing element of corporate transparency,
reﬂects the degree to which ﬁrm-related infor-
mation is distributed unequally between a ﬁrm
and its market participants or among market
participants. A decrease in information asym-
metry can be regarded as evidence for an
increase in corporate transparency. Here, we
measure information asymmetry using the
ﬁnancial analysts’ forecast data included in the
I/B/E/S database because analysts’ forecast
activities can help us to understand those
behaviours of market participants that are
hard to observe directly in capital markets
(Nichols, 1989; Schipper, 1991). The accuracy
and the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts
reﬂect the availability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation being produced and distributed in
the markets. Therefore, analysts’ forecast
error and forecast dispersion can be used
as measures of information asymmetry
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).
In this study, following Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999), by using analysts’ fore-
cast error and forecast dispersion, we examine
whether the increased incentives to improve
transparency after the ﬁnancial crisis led to the
actual mitigation of information asymmetry
around Korean ﬁrms.
In addition, by using analysts’ forecast
error and forecast dispersion, we also address
the following two research questions. Firstly,
we examine whether chaebol ﬁrms have
higher degrees of information asymmetry
around them than non-chaebol ﬁrms. Even
though chaebols have been alleged to be the
major culprit behind the lack of transparency
in the Korean economy, no test has been con-
ducted empirically conﬁrming whether or
not chaebol ﬁrms are less transparent than
non-chaebol ﬁrms. Secondly, we examine
whether chaebol ﬁrms experienced greater
improvement in corporate transparency, after
the ﬁnancial crisis, than non-chaebol ﬁrms, as
a result of contracted internal capital markets
and improved monitoring. The contraction of
the internal capital markets of chaebols, for
example, should have provided more incen-
tives for chaebol ﬁrms to improve their trans-
parency, due to increasing their reliance on
external capital markets. Thus, we hypoth-
esise that the magnitude of impact of changes
after the ﬁnancial crisis on chaebol ﬁrms
should be greater than the magnitude of
impact of changes on non-chaebol ﬁrms.
This study makes a direct contribution to
understanding the effects of economic shock
on the information environment of the ﬁrm.
Speciﬁcally, in this study, the improvement of
the information environment yields a decrease
in the information asymmetry of that environ-
ment, which in turn implies the improvement
of corporate transparency. Further, this study
links prior studies of analysts’ forecast charac-
teristics to corporate transparency issues.
Finally, illuminating the effects of chaebol
membership on information asymmetry, this
study also makes a contribution to under-
standing the relation between the complexity
of an ownership structure and its respective
corporate transparency.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2
summarises the overall changes in the Korean
business environment after the ﬁnancial crisis.
Section 3 describes the changes to the internal
capital markets of Korean business groups as a
result of reforms particularly targeted to chae-
bols. Section 4 describes the data used and the
measurements of variables. Section 5 presents
the results of the empirical analyses. Section 6
shows additional tests for robustness and
alternative explanations. Finally, Section 7
summarises the conclusions.
2. Changes in the Korean business
environment after the ﬁnancial crisis
2.1. Globalisation of the
business environment
Since the ﬁnancial crisis, in response to the
signiﬁcant demands of globalisation, the
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Korean economy has undergone a series of
changes. The various systems of ﬁrms and
ﬁnancial institutions in Korea have been
altered in compliance with global require-
ments. Accounting practices and corporate
governance, for example, have been improved
in such a way as to meet the global standards.
Even more noticeably, far-reaching changes
have occurred in the Korean stock market.
After partially opening its market to foreign
investors for the ﬁrst time in 1992, the Korean
Stock Exchange (KSE) continually mitigated its
foreign investment limit and ﬁnally opened its
market completely to foreign investors as of
May, 1998. The KOSDAQ also began to par-
tially open its market to foreign investors in
September, 1996, and ﬁnally completed its
opening in May, 1998. As a result, with the
abolition of the foreign investment limit,
foreign investors became able to purchase
unregulated quantities of Korean stocks, and
thereby emerged as dominant shareholders in
many Korean ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions.
This resulted in Korean ﬁrms becoming more
responsive to changes in the world economy
and the international capital market. They
became more motivated to establish credibility
in the international capital market by miti-
gating information asymmetry. The global
requirements the Korean economy was faced
with brought about both the changes and
incentives that resulted in its ﬁrms reducing
information asymmetry.5
2.2. The increase in the volume of
capital ﬁnancing via stock market
After the ﬁnancial crisis, the volume of direct
ﬁnancing in Korean ﬁrms, such as equity issu-
ance, increased, while the volume of indirect
ﬁnancing such as bank loans, decreased. The
government began to require that ﬁrms in
highly leveraged business groups, including
chaebols, lower their debt-to-equity ratio to
less than 200 per cent. This drove targeted
ﬁrms to the issuance of equity each time they
needed new ﬁnancing, thus increasing their
dependence on the stock market. Additional
momentum in the shift from indirect to direct
ﬁnancing came from the Korean ﬁnancial insti-
tutions themselves. In order to enhance their
safety after the ﬁnancial crisis, company loans
on credit were contracted while individual
loans on security were expanded. Further, the
boom in the KOSDAQ after 1999 brought
about great opportunity for direct ﬁnancing
for small- and mid-sized ﬁrms in Korea. Thus,
the major source for capital ﬁnancing in
Korean ﬁrms shifted from indirect ﬁnancing to
direct ﬁnancing, and hence the dependence of
Korean ﬁrms on the stock market increased
after the ﬁnancial crisis. These efforts to reduce
their ﬁnancing costs are thought to have pro-
vided the incentives for Korean ﬁrms to miti-
gate information asymmetry, as they sought
easier ﬁnancing in the stock market.
2.3. Rise of a shareholder-oriented
management paradigm
After the ﬁnancial crisis, Korean ﬁrms that
pursued an external growth and diversiﬁca-
tion strategy began to face a new paradigm of
shareholder-oriented management. In the past,
under the government-driven development
policies, such as government-controlled bank-
ing systems and the protection of strategic
industries, ﬁrms relied heavily on debt as a
means of ﬁnancing external growth (Chang
and Hong, 2000). However, after the ﬁnancial
crisis, with the raised level of shareholder
activism, shareholders began to more readily
voice their opinions on matters of corporate
management. For example, the property rights
of minority shareholders and foreign inves-
tors, to whom not much attention was paid in
the past, were strengthened (Yoo, 2000). Also,
the rights of minority shareholders, such as
the examination of ﬁnancial accounts, were
made easier to exercise (Yoo, 2000). Further-
more, ﬁrms had to begin considering the issue
of shareholders’ value. As the investment
project and management performance came to
be evaluated by stock price rather than by
external growth, ﬁrms had to recognise the
costs of ﬁnancing a project versus its proﬁtabil-
ity (Yoo, 2000). These changes after the ﬁnan-
cial crisis are thought to have increased the
incentives for ﬁrms to provide information of
good quality for market participants.
2.4. Government efforts toward the
improvement of corporate transparency
As the IMF identiﬁed the poor corporate gov-
ernance and low transparency of Korean ﬁrms
as major causes of the ﬁnancial crisis, they
asked the Korean government to undertake a
series of actions to improve these factors, in
return for the ﬁnancial rescue package they
offered. In response to these demands, the
Korean government forced big chaebols to
prepare combined ﬁnancial statements, in
order to enhance the transparency of the
investments and transactions among the afﬁli-
ated companies therein. The government also
revised Korean ﬁnancial accounting standards
to be in line with international accounting
standards (IAS), permitted a collective lawsuit
against external auditors, and reinforced
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governmental supervision of external auditing.
Moreover, the government forced the listed
companies on the Korean Stock Exchange
(KSE) to have outside directors totaling as
many as over a fourth of their board members.
For the large companies listed on the KSE, with
assets worth over 2 trillion Korean Won, and
for ﬁnancial institutions, the requirement
entailed having outside directors comprise
more than half of their board members. These
institutional efforts made by the Korean gov-
ernment after the ﬁnancial crisis are thought to
have contributed to increases in the quantita-
tive and qualitative information about ﬁrms,
resulting in the improvement of the informa-
tion environment of Korean ﬁrms. Thus, we
hypothesise the following:
H1: The information asymmetry around
Korean ﬁrms decreased after the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis.
3. Internal capital markets
and transparency
3.1. Internal capital markets and
external capital markets
In emerging markets with market imperfec-
tions, a business group is considered a more
efﬁcient economic organisation, as it mini-
mises transaction costs through the use of
internal markets. In a business environ-
ment where economic infrastructures such as
external markets are underdeveloped, the
internal markets in business groups can sub-
stitute for or complement the imperfect exter-
nal markets. Speciﬁcally, by distributing scarce
resources efﬁciently among afﬁliated ﬁrms
within the same business group, or by decreas-
ing transaction costs between suppliers and
purchasers using vertical integration, diversi-
ﬁed business groups can help their afﬁliated
ﬁrms to overcome the market imperfections
(Leff, 1978; Chang and Choi, 1988; Ghemawat
and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1997,
2000).
In the case of chaebols, the large, diversiﬁed,
business groups in Korea, a few particular
forces have formed their internal capital
markets. The initial impetus for the formation
of internal capital markets was the economic
depression Korea faced right after the Korean
War. Since the various components of busi-
ness infrastructure, such as efﬁcient capital
markets, dependable suppliers, and compe-
tent managers, which are generally taken for
granted in developed countries, were not
available during that time, Korean chaebols
sought to make the most of their own internal
markets in order to capitalise upon what
scarce economic resources they did have
(Sakong and Jones, 1980). Most inﬂuential
in the persistence of these internal capital
markets, however, along with the export-
driven development policies of the Korean
government, were the imperfections of exter-
nal capital markets (Chang and Hong, 2000).
Compared with external capital markets,
internal capital markets have the advantage of
reducing inefﬁciencies in resource allocation,
inefﬁciencies caused by information asymme-
try (Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997). When
the capital allocation of ﬁrms in internal
capital markets is managed by controlling
shareholders/owner-managers, the control-
ling shareholders/owner-managers have more
incentives to monitor resource allocation than
do outside ﬁnancial institutions (Gertner et al.,
1994). Further, the internal competition for
resources in internal markets may also help to
improve efﬁciency in allocating ﬁnancial
resources (Stein, 1997). In a similar vein, Shin
and Park (1999), dividing Korean ﬁrms into
the top 30 chaebol ﬁrms and non-chaebol
ﬁrms, ﬁnd that the internal capital markets in
chaebols have a positive effect on investment
efﬁciency.
However, when there is a severe agency
problem between majority shareholders and
minority shareholders, internal capital mar-
kets, relative to external capital markets, may
wind up misallocating capital and mak-
ing inefﬁcient investments (Lamont, 1997;
Shin and Stultz, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein,
2000). Speciﬁcally, Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
suggest that the possibility of inefﬁcient capi-
tal allocation in internal capital markets is
due to the cross-subsidisations of poorly per-
forming divisions in diversiﬁed ﬁrms, which
in effect represents a socialistic distribution of
investment resources. For example, Lamont
(1997) ﬁnds that oil companies reduced their
investment in non-petroleum divisions when
oil prices declined, which he interprets as evi-
dence for a socialistic allocation of capital, i.e.
support for poorly performing divisions at the
expense of the investment opportunities of
proﬁtable divisions within the same ﬁrm.
Similarly, Shin and Stultz (1998) ﬁnd that the
internal capital markets of US diversiﬁed ﬁrms
failed to allocate funds to the divisions that
had the most growth opportunities.
When it comes to Korean business groups,
Bae et al. (2002) ﬁnd the evidence supporting
the “tunnelling” hypothesis derived from
agency problems. Particularly they show that
while minority shareholders lose, controlling
shareholders of chaebol ﬁrms beneﬁt by acqui-
sition since the acquisition enhances the value
of other ﬁrms in the group. Joh (2003) also
ﬁnds the evidence that when a business group
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transferred resources from a subsidiary to
another, they were often wasted or expropri-
ated by the controlling shareholders. Baek et al.
(2004) ﬁnd that compared with ﬁrms with
higher ownership concentration by unafﬁli-
ated foreign investors, chaebol ﬁrms where the
controlling shareholders’ voting rights exceed
their cash ﬂow rights exhibit a large drop in
equity value during the ﬁnancial crisis in
Korea. However, several researchers who
study business groups in emerging markets
ﬁnd internal markets achieving useful ends
such as market intermediation for products,
ﬁnance, and labour (Khanna and Palepu, 1997,
2000; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Chang and
Choi, 1988).
3.2. Internal capital markets
and transparency
Since Korean chaebols could take advantage of
internal capital markets as a useful source of
capital ﬁnancing, there were not many incen-
tives for chaebol ﬁrms to rely on external
capital markets to ﬁnance their investment
projects. Consequently, Korean chaebols, to
which internal capital markets were easily
available, were not so motivated to mitigate
their information asymmetry as a way of
reducing the ﬁnancing costs, reinforcing
the under-development of external capital
markets. Further, the inactivity of the stock
markets in this environment induced ﬁrms to
rely more on reserved internal funds than
external funds, likewise lowering the incen-
tives for ﬁrms to mitigate information asym-
metry (Krishnaswami et al., 1998).
In a related study, Rajan and Zingales (1995)
document that information asymmetry be-
tween inside and outside investors inﬂuences
the development of external capital markets,
especially that of information-sensitive securi-
ties like equities. As Korean chaebols could
easily access the internal capital markets
within the business group, they were not very
motivated to improve their transparency in
order to get funding from external capital
markets. In addition, since the Korean chae-
bols could receive various beneﬁts from
governmental policies providing preferential
lending terms, chaebol ﬁrms’ reliance on
external equity markets was not high, and thus
they did not feel much need to build credibil-
ity or to improve transparency in external
capital markets.
However, after the ﬁnancial crisis, under the
direction of IMF-driven market reforms,
Korean chaebols had to change. In particular,
since the developed, internal, capital markets
and arbitrary transactions among afﬁliated
companies were indicated as the major causes
of business opaqueness, certain reforms were
targeted to chaebol ﬁrms in an attempt to
contract their internal capital markets while
extending the role of external capital markets.
Speciﬁcally, inApril 1998, the government pro-
hibited new cross-loan guarantees among
afﬁliated companies in chaebols, and also leg-
islated chaebol ﬁrms to dissolve all existing
cross-loan guarantees by March 2003. Conse-
quently, the function of internal capital
markets in chaebols was contracted. Further,
a new regulation requiring highly leveraged
chaebol ﬁrms to lower their debt-to-equity
ratio to less than 200 per cent, prompted tar-
geted ﬁrms to issue equities to meet the ratio,
ﬁnally establishing the dependence of chaebol
ﬁrms on the stock market. Under these post-
crisis circumstances, chaebol ﬁrms became
more motivated than before to mitigate infor-
mation asymmetry, in order to more readily
receive easy ﬁnancing in external capital
markets. In addition, combined ﬁnancial state-
ments were also adopted in 1999 to prevent
arbitrary transactions among afﬁliated compa-
nies, thus improving the transparency of
chaebol ﬁrms.
We test the following additional hypotheses.
First, we hypothesise that chaebol ﬁrms are
less transparent than non-chaebol ﬁrms as
a result of the developed internal capital
markets and arbitrary transactions among
the afﬁliated companies. This is particularly
important because, even though chaebols are
accused of being the major factor behind the
lack of transparency in the Korean economy,
no test has been conducted empirically con-
ﬁrming whether or not chaebol ﬁrms are truly
less transparent than non-chaebol ﬁrms. As a
business group, an organisational form that is
ubiquitous in most emerging markets (Khanna
and Palepu, 1997), chaebols take the form of
pyramidal structures (La Porta et al., 1999).
Their alleged non-transparency is partly con-
tributed to the fact that, in business groups,
controlling shareholders can often move
capital across group ﬁrms with minimal exter-
nal monitoring. The recent economic crises in
Asia and other emerging markets have high-
lighted the concern that business groups are
difﬁcult to monitor due to their disclosures
being inadequate, particularly regarding re-
lated party transactions among group ﬁrms.
Thus, in this paper, we investigate whether
chaebol ﬁrms are less transparent than non-
chaebols, by determining whether they have
higher levels of information asymmetry
than non-chaebol ﬁrms. Second, we examine
whether chaebol ﬁrms experienced greater
improvement in corporate transparency than
non-chaebol ﬁrms, after the ﬁnancial crisis, as
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a result of contracted internal capital markets
and improved monitoring.
H2: Chaebol ﬁrms generally have higher
levels of information asymmetry than non-
chaebol ﬁrms.
H3: Chaebol ﬁrms experienced a greater
decrease in information asymmetry than
non-chaebol ﬁrms after the ﬁnancial crisis.
4. Data and variable deﬁnitions
4.1. Data
Analyst forecast data were obtained from
the I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimate
System) Summary History Tape. I/B/E/S has
covered data on Korean ﬁrms since 1989. In
this study, we compiled sample ﬁrm-years
according to the following criteria among all
Korean ﬁrms listed on the I/B/E/S Summary
History Tape from 1993 to 2001:6
(1) We include ﬁrms whose ﬁnancial data
is available in the TS2000 database of
the KLCA (Korea Listed Companies
Association).
(2) We include ﬁrms whose stock price data is
available in the Stock Database of the KSRI
(Korea Securities Research Institute).
(3) We include ﬁrms whose group member-
ship data is available in the KIS-LINE data-
base of the KIS (Korea Information
Service).
(4) We exclude ﬁnancial institutions and regu-
lated utilities under the supervision of the
government.
(5) We exclude ﬁrms for which Forecast Error,
Forecast Dispersion and Number of Ana-
lysts have missing values concurrently.
From these criteria we obtained the 3,008 ﬁrm-
years in our sample.
4.2. Measurement of variables
Information moves through a market via chan-
nels of communication either from a ﬁrm to its
market, directly, or through intermediary ana-
lysts covering the ﬁrm. Firms provide direct
information to market participants through
various channels such as periodical disclo-
sures (annual reports), occasional disclosures,
investor relation activities and so on. Financial
analysts, then, interpret such information pro-
vided by ﬁrms, as well as by other sources,
and deliver the processed information to
market participants (McNichols and Trueman,
1994). Lang and Lundholm (1996) ﬁnd that
analyst forecasts are more accurate and less
dispersed for ﬁrms with more expanded dis-
closure policies. Higher forecast accuracy and
lower forecast dispersion means that high
quality ﬁrm information is more available to
the market.
Bliss (1997) and Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) ﬁnd that analyst forecast
accuracy improves following a corporate spin-
off. In a similar vein, Gilson et al. (2001) ﬁnd
that, after conglomerates experience stock
breakups such as spin-offs, equity carve-outs,
and targeted stock offerings, the number of
analysts following the respective conglomer-
ates increases and the analyst forecast accuracy
improves. Such increases in forecast accuracy
can be explained by the enhanced disclosure
through segmented reporting after these
breakups. Particularly, using analysts’ forecast
error and forecast dispersion as the measures
of information asymmetry, Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) show that ﬁrms in need
of external capital enhance their disclosure via
spin-offs, mitigating information asymmetry,
and consequently reducing ﬁnancing costs.
Therefore, in this study, following the prior
studies, we examine the changes in corporate
transparency of Korean ﬁrms in terms of infor-
mation asymmetry measured by analysts’
forecast error and forecast dispersion.7
Forecast Error, which measures the forecast
accuracy of analysts, is deﬁned as the absolute
value of the difference between the actual EPS
(earnings per share) and the median analyst
forecast of EPS. The difference is deﬂated by
the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across
ﬁrms. The median analyst forecast we use here
is the ﬁnal one calculated before the actual EPS
is released.8 In the case that the EPS forecasts
are made by fewer than three analysts, the
variable is rendered to have a missing value. In
this study, we transform the Forecast Error
into logarithmic form because its distribution
is highly skewed.9 The equation for computing
Log(Forecast Error) is as follows:
Log Forecast Error
Log actual EPS median
analyst forecast of E
( ) =
−( (
PS actual EPS) )
Forecast Dispersion among analysts is the
standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts of
EPS. The standard deviation is deﬂated by the
absolute value of the actual EPS to facilitate
comparisons across ﬁrms. The standard devia-
tion we use here is the ﬁnal one calculated
before the actual EPS is released. In the case
that the EPS forecasts are made by fewer than
three analysts, the Forecast Dispersion is ren-
dered to have a missing value. In this study, we
transform Forecast Dispersion into logarith-
mic form, due to its distribution being highly
skewed.10 The equation for computing Log-
(Forecast Dispersion) is as follows:
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Log forecast dispersion
Log the standard deviation of analyst
f
( ) =
(
orecasts of EPS actual EPS )
Number of Analysts is the number of sell-
side analysts providing the annual earnings
forecasts for a particular ﬁrm. For example, the
IBES Summary Tape shows that there are 22
ﬁnancial analysts who provide the 2001 annual
earnings forecasts for Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd, as of November 2001. Among the 22
analysts, seven of them belong to Korean secu-
rity ﬁrms and 15 of them belong to interna-
tional brokerage houses.11 In each security
ﬁrm, only one analyst follows Samsung Elec-
tronics Co., Ltd. In this study, we use the
number of estimates as equivalent to Number
of Analysts, the ﬁnal estimate provided by
each analyst being used in the ﬁnal statistical
calculation before the actual EPS is released.
Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in
the case that the year of ﬁrm observation
belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis
(i.e. 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001), and 0 other-
wise. As for observations in 1997 when the
ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy
takes a missing value. Thus, this variable cap-
tures overall changes after the ﬁnancial crisis.
As we suppose that information asymmetry
around Korean ﬁrms became lower under the
changed business environment after the ﬁnan-
cial crisis, Post-Crisis Dummy is expected to
have a negative association with Forecast Error
and Forecast Dispersion.
Chaebol Dummy takes the value of 1 in the
case that the business group to which the ﬁrm
followed by analysts belongs, is ranked in the
top 30 on a basis of total assets (the sum of total
assets of afﬁliated companies belonging to the
same business groups) at the ﬁscal year-end,
and 0 otherwise. As we expect that chaebol
ﬁrms have higher information asymmetry
than non-chaebol ﬁrms, Chaebol Dummy is
expected to have a positive association with
Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion.
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy is a
term representing the interaction of Chaebol
Dummy and Post-Crisis Dummy. As we
expect that chaebol ﬁrms have experienced
greater improvement in corporate transpar-
ency than non-chaebol ﬁrms as a result of
reforms particularly targeted to chaebol ﬁrms,
e.g. improved monitoring, we hypothesise that
the magnitude of impact of changes after the
ﬁnancial crisis on chaebol ﬁrms should be
greater than that on non-chaebol ﬁrms. A
positive association between this interactive
term and Forecast Error/Forecast Dispersion
would support this hypothesis.
We control for Log(Market Value) and Stan-
dard Deviation of Stock Returns in the regres-
sion of Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion.
Further, we control for Log(Market Value),
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns, Majority
Shareholder Share, Domestic Institution In-
vestor Share, and Foreign Investor Share in the
regression of Number of Analysts. In each
regression, we include 12 industry dummies
as additional control variables to control for
industry effects.
Market Value is the market value of the
ﬁrm’s equity, deﬁned as the closing price of
the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end mul-
tiplied by the number of common shares out-
standing. We use this variable as a proxy for
ﬁrm size. Firm size is likely to inﬂuence fore-
cast characteristics because it affects analysts’
incentives to gather information about the ﬁrm
(Lang and Lundholm 1996). Generally, ﬁrms
with larger market value have higher disclo-
sure policies, which can help analysts to fore-
cast more accurately. In this vein, Lang and
Lundholm (1996) show that accuracy is posi-
tively associated with market value, suggest-
ing that analysts’ forecasts are relatively more
accurate for larger ﬁrms. Further, they ﬁnd
that the relation between the standard devia-
tions of analysts’ forecasts and the ﬁrm’s
market value is negative, indicating that an-
alysts’ forecasts are less dispersed for larger
ﬁrms. Additionally, Brown et al. (1985), Brown
et al. (1987), and Eddy and Seifert (1982) also
show that larger ﬁrm has smaller forecast
error.
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns,
deﬁned as the historical standard deviation of
daily stock returns computed over a year,
reﬂects the internal uncertainty of a ﬁrm, and
thus affects forecast characteristics. As this
variable reﬂects the reliability of information
contained in a stock price, analyst forecasting
for ﬁrms with higher Standard Deviation of
Stock Returns becomes more difﬁcult, and
thus becomes less accurate.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the vari-
ables used in this study. As shown in Panel A,
in the pooled sample, the mean and the
median of Forecast Error are 54.97 per cent
and 22.84 per cent of the actual EPS, respec-
tively, and the mean and the median of Fore-
cast Dispersion are 39.41 per cent and 20.85
per cent of the actual EPS respectively. Log-
(Forecast Error) has a mean of -1.5729 and
a median of -1.4761, and Log(Forecast Dis-
persion) has a mean of -1.5072 and a median
of -1.5675. These results suggest that the
distributions of Log(Forecast Error) and
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Log(Forecast Dispersion) are less skewed and
also closer to normality than those of Forecast
Error and Forecast Dispersion respectively.
Panel B shows that these variables have
higher values in post-crisis period than in
pre-crisis period. The mean and the median
of Forecast Error, which amounted to 48.71
per cent and 19.78 per cent of the actual EPS,
respectively, in pre-crisis period, rose up to
60.07 per cent and 26.28 per cent of the actual
EPS, respectively, in post-crisis period. Also,
the mean and the median of Forecast Disper-
sion, which amounted to 31.66 per cent and
17.99 per cent of the actual EPS, respectively,
in pre-crisis period, rose up to 47.23 per cent
and 23.14 per cent of the actual EPS, re-
spectively, in post-crisis period. Log(Forecast
Error) and Log(Forecast Dispersion) show the
same patterns as well. However, these results
do not indicate that information asymmetry
around Korean ﬁrms, measured by Log(Fore-
cast Error) and Log(Forecast Dispersion),
increased after the ﬁnancial crisis. This is
because other factors that can inﬂuence
analyst forecast characteristics were not con-
trolled for in these simple analyses. As we
will see later, in Table 3, multivariate analyses
that control for such factors show the oppo-
site results.
Panel C shows that the mean and the
median of Forecast Error are higher for
chaebol ﬁrms than for non-chaebol ﬁrms. It
also shows that the mean and the median of
Forecast Dispersion are higher for chaebol
ﬁrms than for non-chaebol ﬁrms. However,
the differences are not signiﬁcant. Log(Fore-
cast Error) and Log(Forecast Dispersion) show
the same pattern. The mean and the median of
these variables are higher for chaebol ﬁrms
than those of non-chaebol ﬁrms. However,
while the differences between medians are sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 per cent level, the differences
between means are not signiﬁcant. These
results, nevertheless, do not indicate that infor-
mation asymmetry around chaebol ﬁrms is not
signiﬁcantly higher than that around non-
chaebol ﬁrms. This is because, once again,
other factors that can inﬂuence analyst forecast
characteristics were not controlled for in these
simple analyses.As we will see later, multivari-
ate analyses that control for such factors show
that information asymmetry around chaebol
ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher than that around
non-chaebol ﬁrms.
Panel A, again, shows that Log(Market
Value) has a mean of 24.81 and a median of
24.61 in the pooled sample. It also shows that
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns has a
mean of 0.0374 and a median of 0.0356 in the
pooled sample. Panel B shows that the mean
and the median of Log(Market Value) in the
post-crisis period are signiﬁcantly lower than
those in the pre-crisis period, and that the
mean and the median of Standard Deviation of
Stock Returns in the post-crisis period are sig-
niﬁcantly higher than those in the pre-crisis
period. Meanwhile, Panel C shows the mean
and the median of Log(Market Value) in
chaebol ﬁrms to be signiﬁcantly higher than
those in non-chaebol ﬁrms, and the mean (but
not the median) of Standard Deviation of Stock
Returns in chaebol ﬁrms to be signiﬁcantly
lower than those in non-chaebol ﬁrms.As Log-
(Market Value) and Standard Deviation of
Stock Returns are controlled for in the regres-
sion analyses in this study, these results
explain why the implication of the multivariate
analyses is different from that of the simple
analyses above.
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlations
between variables used in this study. Log-
(Forecast Error) has a signiﬁcantly positive
correlation with Log(Forecast Dispersion),
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns, and
Post-Crisis Dummy, while it has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative correlation with Number of
Analysts, Log(Market Value), Domestic Insti-
tution Investor Share, and Foreign Investor
Share. Log(Forecast Dispersion) has a signiﬁ-
cantly positive correlation with Standard
Deviation of Stock Returns, Chaebol Dummy,
and Post-Crisis Dummy, while it has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative correlation with Majority
Shareholder Share and Foreign Investor
Share. Number of Analysts has a signiﬁcantly
positive correlation with Log(Market Value),
Domestic Institution Investor Share, Foreign
Investor Share, and Chaebol Dummy, while
it has a signiﬁcantly negative correlation
with Standard Deviation of Stock Returns,
Majority Shareholder Share, and Post-Crisis
Dummy. Here again, the signiﬁcantly positive
correlations between Log(Forecast Error)/
Log(Forecast Dispersion) and Post-Crisis
Dummy are not evidence that information
asymmetry around Korean ﬁrms increased
after the ﬁnancial crisis, due to other factors
that can inﬂuence analyst forecast character-
istics not being controlled for in these simple
analyses. As we will see later, in Table 3, mul-
tivariate analyses that control for such factors
show the opposite results.
5.2. Regressions of log(forecast error)
and log(forecast dispersion)
Table 3 shows the results of the regression of
Log(Forecast Error) and Log(Forecast Disper-
sion). The regression model of Log(Forecast
Error) used in Panel A is constructed as
follows:
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Model Log Forecast Error
a b Post-Crisis Dummy
b Log Market
1
1
4
: ( ) =
+
+ Value  
b Standard Deviation of Stock Returns
Industry Dummie
( )
+
+
5
s e+
Model Log Forecast Error
a b Chaebol Dummy
b Log Market Valu
2
2
4
: ( ) =
+
+ e
b Standard Deviation of Stock Returns
Industry Dummies e
( )
+
+ +
5
Model Log Forecast Error
a b Post-Crisis Dummy
b Chaebol Du
3
1
2
: ( ) =
+
+ mmy
b Post-Crisis Dummy Chaebol Dummy
b Log Market Value
b
+ ∗
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In Panel A, we used 1,328 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations for Model 1 and Model 3 and used
1,418 ﬁrm-year observations for Model 2.
Model 2 uses more observations since it
includes the data from 1997 while Model 1 and
Model 3 exclude them by the deﬁnition of
Post-Crisis Dummy. Panel A shows that Post-
Crisis Dummy has a signiﬁcantly negative
association with Log(Forecast Error) both in
Model 1 and Model 3. The estimated coefﬁ-
cients of Post-Crisis Dummy signify that ana-
lysts’ forecast error is 52 per cent lower for
ﬁrms in the post-crisis period than for ﬁrms in
the pre-crisis period.12 This result suggests that
Korean ﬁrms in the pre-crisis period had gen-
erally higher information asymmetry than
those in the post-crisis period. Thus, this
result supports Hypothesis 1, suggesting that,
under the changed business environment af-
ter the ﬁnancial crisis, information asymmetry
around Korean ﬁrms decreased.13
Panel A also shows that Chaebol Dummy
has a signiﬁcantly positive association with
Log(Forecast Error) in Model 2 and Model 3,
indicating that analyst forecasting for chaebol
ﬁrms is less accurate than for non-chaebol
ﬁrms. The estimated coefﬁcients of Chaebol
Dummy signify that analysts’ forecast error is
66 per cent higher in Model 2 and 47 per cent
higher in Model 3 for chaebol ﬁrms than
for non-chaebol ﬁrms.14 This result supports
Hypothesis 2, suggesting that chaebol ﬁrms
generally have higher information asymmetry
than non-chaebol ﬁrms.15 Higher information
asymmetry around chaebol ﬁrms implies that
Table 2: Pearson correlations among variables
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Post-Crisis
Dummy
1 Log(Forocast Error) 0.3841 -0.1994 -0.1838 0.1983 -0.0156 -0.0793 -0.1684 0.0224 0.0775
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.5577 0.0032 <0.0001 0.3448 0.0015
2 Log(Forecast Dispersion) -0.0099 -0.0090 0.1974 -0.0661 0.0096 -0.0796 0.0498 0.1475
0.6751 0.7360 <0.0001 0.0130 0.7222 0.0028 0.0352 <0.0001
3 Number of Analysts 0.7933 -0.1971 -0.1297 0.3106 0.5207 0.3626 -0.0318
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0982
4 Log(MarketValue) -0.3035 -0.1438 0.4409 0.4776 0.5017 -0.0544
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0123
5 Standard Deviation of
Stock Returns
0.0424 -0.2301 -0.1496 -0.0845 0.7911
0.0427 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
6 Majority Share holder
Share
-0.0757 0.0077 -0.1755 0.1238
0.0004 0.7154 <0.0001 <0.0001
7 Domestic Institution
Investor Share
0.0966 0.4297 -0.1345
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
8 Foreign Investor Share 0.2330 0.0609
<0.0001 0.0064
9 Chaebol Dummy -0.0292
0.1293
Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis: 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period before the ﬁnancial crisis: 1993,
1994, 1995, and 1996.As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy takes a missing value. Other
variables below are the same as the variables in Table 1.
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the incentives of chaebol ﬁrms to earn credibil-
ity from external capital markets by mitigating
information asymmetry is not so great as for
that of non-chaebol ﬁrms. This is believed to
be because chaebol ﬁrms can rely on their
own internal capital markets such as cross-
subsidisations, cross-shareholdings, and cross-
loan guarantees.
In Panel A, Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol
Dummy does not show a signiﬁcantly nega-
tive association with Log(Forecast Error) in
Model 3. This result does not support Hypo-
thesis 3, suggesting that, even though the over-
all level of information asymmetry around
Korean ﬁrms (both chaebol ﬁrms and non-
chaebol ﬁrms) decreased after the ﬁnancial
crisis, chaebol ﬁrms did not experience a
greater decrease in information asymmetry
than non-chaebol ﬁrms, despite the reforms
particularly targeted to chaebol ﬁrms such as
Table 3: Regression results of log(forecast error) and log(forecast dispersion)
Panel A. Log(Forecast Error)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept 0.668 (0.74) 3.973 (4.39)*** 2.462 (2.47)**
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.731 (-4.62)*** -0.726 (-4.45)***
Chaebol Dummy 0.507 (5.17)*** 0.384 (2.95)***
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy 0.076 (0.44)
Log(Market Value) -0.140 (-4.56)*** -0.255 (-7.78)** -0.211 (-6.03)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 46.161 (7.39)*** 21.469 (6.66)*** 44.681 (7.17)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0843 0.0841 0.0948
Number of Observed Firms 1328 1418 1328
Panel B. Log(Forecast Dispersion)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept -2.824 (-4.73)*** -1.666 (-2.79)*** -1.859 (-2.82)***
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.193 (-1.84)* -0.201 (-1.85)*
Chaebol Dummy 0.248 (3.83)*** 0.189 (2.18)**
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy 0.079 (0.68)
Log(Market Value) 0.015 (0.72) -0.026 -1.22 -0.023 (-1.00)
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 21.459 (5.16)*** 14.802 (6.91)*** 20.551 (4.94)***
Industry Dummy Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0512 0.0550 0.0582
Number of Observed Firms 1323 1413 1323
Signiﬁcance Level: *5~10%, **1~5%, ***less than 1%.
Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the median analyst forecast of EPS. The difference is
deﬂated by the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms. Forecast Dispersion among analysts is the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts of EPS. The standard deviation is deﬂated by the absolute value of the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms.
Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis: 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period before the ﬁnancial crisis: 1993,
1994, 1995, and 1996. As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy takes a missing value.
Chaebol Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the business group to which the ﬁrm followed by analysts belongs, is ranked in the
top 30 on a basis of total assets (the sum of total assets of afﬁliated companies belonging to the same business groups) at the ﬁscal
year-end, and 0 otherwise. Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy is deﬁned as Post-Crisis Dummy multiplied by Chaebol Dummy.
Market Value is the market value of the ﬁrms’ equity, deﬁned as the closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end multiplied
by the number of common shares outstanding. Standard Deviation of Stock Returns is the historical standard deviation of daily stock
returns computed over a year.
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restrictions to their internal capital markets
and improved monitoring.
In Panel A, control variables show the
expected results in Model 1, Model 2 and
Model 3. Log(Market Value) has a signiﬁcantly
negative association with Log(Forecast Error).
This result implies that larger ﬁrms disclose
relatively more information than do smaller
ﬁrms, consistent with prior ﬁndings that earn-
ings forecasts for larger ﬁrms are more accu-
rate (Brown et al., 1985; Brown et al., 1987;
Eddy and Seifert, 1982). Standard Deviation
of Stock Returns has a signiﬁcantly positive
association with Log(Forecast Error). This
result implies that analyst forecasting for ﬁrms
with higher variability in their stock returns
becomes more difﬁcult and thus less accurate.
In Panel B, we used 1,323 ﬁrm-year observa-
tions for Model 1 and Model 3 and used 1,413
ﬁrm-year observations for Model 2. Consistent
with Panel A, Panel B also shows Post-Crisis
Dummy to have a signiﬁcantly negative asso-
ciation with Log(Forecast Dispersion) in both
Models 1 and 3. The estimated coefﬁcients of
Post-Crisis Dummy signify that analysts’ fore-
casts are 18 per cent less dispersed for ﬁrms in
the post-crisis period than for ﬁrms in the pre-
crisis period.16 This result supports Hypothesis
1, suggesting that information asymmetry
around Korean ﬁrms decreased after the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. Consistent with Panel A, Panel B
also shows Chaebol Dummy to have a signiﬁ-
cantly positive association with Log(Forecast
Dispersion) in Model 2. The estimated coefﬁ-
cients of Chaebol Dummy signify that analyst
forecasts are 28 per cent more dispersed in
Model 2 and 21 per cent more dispersed in
Model 3 for chaebol ﬁrms than for non-
chaebol ﬁrms.17 This result supports Hypoth-
esis 2, suggesting that chaebol ﬁrms generally
have higher information asymmetry than non-
chaebol ﬁrms. Further, in Panel B Post-Crisis
Dummy * Chaebol Dummy does not show a
signiﬁcant association with Log(Forecast Dis-
persion) in Model 3. As for control variables in
Panel B, while Standard Deviation of Stock
Returns has a signiﬁcantly positive association
with Log(Forecast Dispersion) in all three
Models, Log(Market Value) does not show a
signiﬁcant association with Log(Forecast Dis-
persion).18
5.3. Regressions of the number
of analysts
Table 4 shows the regression results of
Number of Analysts. Number of Analysts
reﬂects the quantity of information about ﬁrms
that analysts or the market discloses. Speciﬁ-
cally, as more information about ﬁrms is
disclosed in the market, the information envi-
ronment around ﬁrms can become more
improved. In this vein, Alford and Berger
(1999) ﬁnd that analyst forecasts become more
accurate as the number of analysts following a
particular ﬁrm increases. Accordingly, since
Number ofAnalysts, along with Forecast Error
and Forecast Dispersion, is an important vari-
able reﬂecting the information environment
around ﬁrms, we additionally performed the
regression of Number of Analysts on Post-
Crisis Dummy and on Chaebol Dummy. In
these regressions, we control for ﬁrm size and
ownership structure variables because they
can affect the supply and demand of analysts’
reporting services. The regression model of
Number of Analysts used in Table 4 is con-
structed as follows:
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In Table 4, we use 1,912 ﬁrm-year observa-
tions between 1993 and 2001 excluding 1997 in
Model 1 and Model 3 and use 2,163 ﬁrm-year
observations in Model 2 between 1993 and
2001. Table 4 shows that Post-Crisis Dummy
does not have a signiﬁcant association with
Number of Analysts in both Models 1 and 2.
This result suggests that there was not a sig-
niﬁcant change in the number of analysts fol-
lowing Korean ﬁrms in the post-crisis period
versus the pre-crisis period. Thus, it seems
that increased analyst presence has not been
a signiﬁcant contributor to the observed
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improvement in the information environment
around Korean ﬁrms after the ﬁnancial crisis.
Meanwhile, Table 4 shows that Chaebol
Dummyhas a signiﬁcantly positive association
with Number of Analysts in both Model 2 and
Model 3. This result suggests that 72 per cent
more analysts follow chaebol ﬁrms than non-
chaebol ﬁrms in Model 2 and 66 per cent more
in Model 3.19 However, since chaebol ﬁrms
have higher information asymmetry than non-
chaebol ﬁrms, as shown in Table 3, it seems
that the greater analyst coverage for chaebol
ﬁrms does not contribute to the mitigation of
information asymmetry around them.
Log(Market Value) shows a signiﬁcantly
positive association with Number of Analysts
in all three Models, suggesting that analysts
are more likely to follow larger ﬁrms. Because
the demand for analyst coverage is affected by
ﬁrm size, the market value of analyst reports
for large ﬁrms seems higher than that for small
ﬁrms. Majority Shareholder Share shows a sig-
niﬁcantly negative association with Number of
Analysts in all three Models. This result sug-
gests that the demand of insiders for analysts’
reporting services is not as high as that of
outside investors because insiders suffer less
from information asymmetry than do outside
investors. Foreign Investor Share shows a sig-
niﬁcantly positive association with Number
of Analysts in all three Models. This result
suggests that foreign investors have a high
demand for analysts’ reporting services,
because foreign investors most severely suffer
from information asymmetry. Finally, Domes-
tic Institution Investor Share shows a negative
association with Number of Analysts, signiﬁ-
cantly in Model 2 and Model 3 but not signiﬁ-
cantly in Model 1.
6. Additional tests
6.1. Samples of ﬁrms in both periods
The pooled sample used in the regression
analyses in Table 3 consists of ﬁrm-year obser-
vations where Log(Forecast Error) or Log-
(Forecast Dispersion) is not missing between
1993 and 2001. However, in this whole sample,
ﬁrms comprising the pre-crisis (1993~1996)
sub-sample are not the same as ﬁrms compris-
ing the post-crisis (1998~2001) sub-sample. To
cope with the concern that the results in
Table 3 were due to the difference in ﬁrm com-
Table 4: Regression results of number of analysts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept -44.016 (-33.25)*** -41.336 (-33.20)*** -42.423 (-30.25)***
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.053 (-0.29) -0.042 (-0.23)
Chaebol Dummy 0.541 (3.86)*** 0.508 (3.37)***
Log(Market Value) 1.963 (40.42)*** 1.856 (39.93)*** 1.903 (36.87)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Return 9.821 (1.53) 5.148 (1.38) 7.785 (1.21)
Majority Shareholder Share -0.009 (-2,46)** -0.009 (-2.54)** -0.008 (-2.12)**
Domestic Institution Investor Share -0.004 (-1.16) -0.008 (-2.58)** -0.007 (-2.00)**
Foreign Investor Share 0.065 (11.49)*** 0.063 (11.92)*** 0.064 (11.42)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.6756 0.6699 0.6773
Number of Observed Firms 1912 2163 1912
Signiﬁcance Level: *5~100%, **1~5%, ***less than 1%.
Number of Analysts is the number of sell-side analysts who are afﬁliated with security ﬁrms around the world and who provide the
annual earnings forecasts for a particular ﬁrm. Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs
to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis: 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs
to the period before the ﬁnancial crisis: 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred,
Post-Crisis Dummy takes a missing value. Chaebol Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the business group, to which the ﬁrm
followed by analysts belongs, is ranked in the top 30 on a basis of total assets (the sum of total assets of afﬁliated companies belonging
to the same business groups) at the ﬁscal year-end, and 0 otherwise. Market Value is the market value of the ﬁrms’ equity, deﬁned as the
closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. Standard Deviation of
Stock Returns is the historical standard deviation of daily stock returns computed over a year. Majority Shareholder Share is the sum of
the shares owned by the largest shareholder and by the related persons to him or her. Foreign Investor Share is the sum of the shares
owned by foreign individuals and corporations. Domestic Institution Investor Share is the sum of the shares owned by domestic ﬁnancial
institutions, security ﬁrms, and insurance ﬁrms.
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position between the two periods, in a robust-
ness test, we use the sub-sample of ﬁrms that
exist in both periods. Table 5 shows the regres-
sion results using this reduced sample. Consis-
tent with Table 3, Table 5 shows that the
coefﬁcient of Post-Crisis Dummy is signiﬁcant
and negative in Panel A and in Panel B. These
results suggest that information asymmetry
around Korean ﬁrms has decreased after the
ﬁnancial crisis, supporting Hypothesis 1.
Table 5 also shows that Chaebol Dummy has a
signiﬁcantly positive association with Log-
(Forecast Error) in Model 2 and Model 3 of
Panel A and also with Log(Forecast Disper-
sion) in Model 2 of Panel B, but not a signiﬁ-
cant association with Log(Forecast Dispersion)
in Model 3 of Panel B. Post-Crisis Dummy *
Chaebol Dummy does not have signiﬁcant
Table 5: Regression results of log(forecast error) and log(forecast dispersion)
Panel A. Log(Forocast Error)
Model I Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept 2.670 (1.58) 5.800 (3.61)*** 4.572 (2.63)***
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.641 (-2.43)** -0.559 (-1.97)*
Chaebol Dummy 0.676 (4.84)*** 0.526 (2.67)**
Post-Crisis Dummy * çhaebol Dummy 0.050 (0.18)
Log(Market Value) -0.213 (-3.66)*** -0.326 (-5.71)*** -0.288 (-4.76)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 49.071 (4.60)*** 25.813 (4.61)*** 43.696 (4.08)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0972 0.1261 0.1246
Number of Observed Firms 413 461 413
Panel B. Log(Forecast Dispersion)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept -1.529 (-1.55) 0.418 (0.44) -0.732 (-0.71)
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.466 (-3.02)*** -0.475 (*2.84)***
Chaebol Dummy 0.29734 (3.62)*** 0.152 (1.30)
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy 0.118 (0.73)
Log(Market Value) -0.036 (-1.05) -0.09833 (-2.9l)*** -0.066 (-1.84)*
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 33.574 (5.41)*** 17.28646 (5.29)*** 30.975 (4.92)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0902 0.0949 0.1003
Number of Observed Firms 412 460 412
Signiﬁcance Level: *5~10%, **1~5%, ***less than 1%.
Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the median analyst forecast of EPS. The difference is
deﬂated by the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms. Forecast Dispersion among analysts is the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts of EPS. The standard deviation is deﬂated by the absolute value of the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms.
Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis: 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period before the ﬁnancial crisis: 1993,
1994, 1995, and 1996. As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy takes a missing value.
Chaebol Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the business group, to which the ﬁrm followed by analysts belongs, is ranked in the
top 30 on a basis of total assets (the sum of total assets of afﬁliated companies belonging to the same business groups) at the ﬁscal
year-end, and 0 otherwise. Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy is deﬁned as Post-Crisis Dummy multiplied by Chaebol Dummy.
Market Value is the market value of the ﬁrms’ equity, deﬁned as the closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end multiplied
by the number of common shares outstanding. Standard Deviation of Stock Returns is the historical standard deviation of daily stock
returns computed over a year.
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coefﬁcients in either Panel A or Panel B, failing
to support Hypothesis 3. In addition, using
this sub-sample of ﬁrms that continued to exist
each year in both periods, we tested the same
hypotheses with the ﬁxed effects model.
Though not reported in tables, results show
that Post-Crisis Dummy has a signiﬁcantly
negative association with both Log(Forecast
Error) and Log(Forecast Dispersion), but
Chaebol Dummy does not.
6.2. Analyst forecast optimism
Analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable
investment information because they fear
jeopardising potential investment banking
business, which may lose them access to man-
agement as a source of information. Analysts
also seek to generate trading commissions
(McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). Academic lit-
erature has suggested that these two forces
cause analysts to bias their true predictions
toward a more optimistic view (Francis and
Philbrick, 1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1995;
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997).
To investigate whether analyst optimism
biases our results, we divide the whole sample
into an optimistic forecast sub-sample and a
non-optimistic forecast sub-sample, and then
perform the regression of Log(Forecast Error)
on the two sub-samples separately, as seen in
Table 6. The optimistic forecast sub-sample is
composed of ﬁrm-years in which forecasted
EPS is greater than actual EPS, while the non-
optimistic forecast sub-sample is composed of
ﬁrm-years in which forecasted EPS is less than
actual EPS.20
Panel A of Table 6 shows the regression
results using the optimistic forecast sub-
sample, while Panel B shows the regression
results using the non-optimistic forecast sub-
sample. The number of observations used in
each regression indicates that optimism domi-
nates. However, regression results do not
show the difference between Panel A and
Panel B. These results imply that our results are
not distorted by analysts’ forecast optimism.
6.3. Forecast horizon
Forecast accuracy can be affected by Forecast
Horizon, deﬁned as the time difference
between forecast date and earnings report
date: the greater the Forecast Horizon the
lesser the forecast accuracy. Thus, Forecast
Error is expected to get smaller as the forecast
date comes closer to the earnings announce-
ment date. However, in this study, as we use
the median analyst forecast calculated before
the actual EPS is released, each observed ﬁrm-
year can have a different Forecast Horizon.
Therefore, to mitigate the concern that the
Forecast Horizon can affect our results, we
perform the regressions of Log(Forecast Error)
and Log(Forecast Dispersion) after controll-
ing for Forecast Horizon. Table 7 shows the
regression results, which are consistent with
the results in Table 3.21
6.4. Analysts’ experience – learning
by doing
One possible explanation for the negative coef-
ﬁcient of Post-Crisis Dummy we found earlier
is that there exists a learning curve that leads
to improved accuracy as time passes. In this
case, the coefﬁcient of Post-Crisis Dummy
would be capturing the accumulated knowl-
edge about ﬁrms acquired by “Learning by
Doing”, rather than by way of changes in the
business environment, itself. The negative
coefﬁcient of Post-Crisis Dummy, then, would
just be capturing the negative association
between analysts’ experience and their fore-
cast error. To address this concern, similar
to Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999),
we measure analysts’ learning experience
through their forecast experience.22 Speciﬁ-
cally, Clement (1999) uses two proxies for
experience: general experience and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc experience. General experience is cal-
culated as the number of years for which a
certain analyst supplied forecasts for any ﬁrms
before the actual earnings of those ﬁrms were
released, in a given year. Also, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
experience is calculated as the number of years
for which a certain analyst supplied forecasts
for a particular ﬁrm before the actual earnings
of that ﬁrm were released, in a given year.
These experience variables are also surrogates
for analyst ability and skill.
In this study, before calculating the experi-
ence of analysts, we exclude from the sample
analysts who appear in the data set in the
initial year (1989) because we cannot tell how
much experience analysts had had, prior to the
ﬁrst year of available data.23 Then, following
Clement (1999), we measure the experience
of each individual analyst through the two
experience variables, i.e. general experience
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc experience. From these indi-
vidual experience variables, we calculate the
median values of experience of analysts who
provide forecasts for a particular ﬁrm in a
given year.
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics
of these two experience variables. General
Experience means the median value of
general experience of analysts who provide
forecasts for a particular ﬁrm-year. And Firm-
Speciﬁc Experience means the median value
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of ﬁrm-speciﬁc experience of analysts who
provide forecasts for a particular ﬁrm-year.
When it comes to General Experience, results
show that analysts had had, on average,
2.17 years’ experience before the ﬁnancial
crisis, while they had, on average, 2.21 years’
experience after the ﬁnancial crisis. This
suggests that analysts in the post-crisis
period are more experienced than analysts in
the pre-crisis period, though the difference
is not signiﬁcant. However, when it comes
to Firm-Speciﬁc Experience, analysts in the
pre-crisis period have signiﬁcantly more
experience than analysts in the post-crisis
period. These results seem to be caused
by newly, incoming analysts, who started
their forecasting careers in the post-crisis
period.
Table 6: Regression results of log(forecast error)
Panel A. Optimistic Analyst Forecast
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept 1.682 (1.31) 4.690 (3,62)*** 3932 (2.77)***
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.448 (-1.91)* -0.546 (-2.25)**
Chaebol Dummy 0.576 (4.26)*** 0.417 (2.40)**
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy 0.236 (0.95)
Log(Market Value) -0.155 (-3.46)*** 0.265 (-5.53)*** -0.247 (-4.82)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Return 40.158 (4.51)*** 25.027 (5.67)*** 39.847 (4.51)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0896 0.0995 0.1042
Number of Observed Firms 740 800 740
Panel B. Non-Optimistic Analyst Forecast
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept -0.561 (-0.49) 1.636 (1.43) 0.537 (0.42)
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.531 (-2.67)*** -0.450 (-2.19)**
Chaebol Dummy 0.334 (2.61)*** 0.372 (2.04)**
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy -0.181 (-0.79)
Log(Market Value) -0.120 (-3.14)*** -0.198 (-4.90)*** -0.164 (-3.71)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 39.970 (4.96)*** 21.765 (5.10)*** 39.047 (4.82)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adiusted R2 0.0907 0.0912 0.0952
Number of Observed Firms 588 618 588
Signiﬁcance Level: *5~10%. **1~5%. ***less than 1%.
Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the median analyst forecast of EPS. The difference is
deﬂated by the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms. Forecast Dispersion among analysts is the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts of EPS. The standard deviation is deﬂated by the absolute value of the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms.
Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis: 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period before the ﬁnancial crisis: 1993,
1994, 1995, and 1996. As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy takes a missing value.
Chaebol Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the business group, to which the ﬁrm followed by analysts belongs, is ranked in the
top 30 on a basis of total assets (the sum of total assets of afﬁliated companies belonging to the same business groups) at the ﬁscal
year-end, and 0 otherwise. Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy is deﬁned as Post-Crisis Dummy multiplied by Chaebol Dummy.
Market Value is the market value of the ﬁrms’ equity, deﬁned as the closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end multiplied
by the number of common shares outstanding. Standard Deviation of Stock Returns is the historical standard deviation of daily stock
returns computed over a year.
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To disentangle analysts’ learning effect
from Post-Crisis Dummy, we include the
two experience variables as additional control
variables in our regression model. Table 9
shows that both General Experience and
Firm-Speciﬁc Experience do not have signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcients, while Post-Crisis Dummy
still has a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient.
Table 9 also implies that forecast experience
cannot be the valid explanation for the
improved forecast accuracy after the ﬁnancial
crisis.24
Table 7: Regression results of log(forecast error) and log(forecast dispersion)
Panel A. Log(Forecast Error)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept 0.883 (0.97) 4.137 (4.50)*** 2.603 (2.60)***
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.718 (-4.53)*** -0.724 (-4.43)***
Chaebol Dummy 0.484 (4.88)*** 0.345 (2.64)***
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy 0.117 (0.67)
Log(Market Value) -0.155 (-5.00)*** -0.266 (-8.00)*** -0.222 (-6.30)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 46.752 (7.46)*** 21.869 (6.72)*** 45.049 (7.19)***
Forecast Horizon 0.011 (2.98)*** 0.008 (2.36)** 0.010 (2.70)***
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0898 0.0874 0.0993
Number of Observed Firms 1317 1385 1317
Panel B. Log(Forecast Dispersion)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept -2.922 (-4.85)*** -1.675 (-2.75)*** -1.943 (-2.92)***
Post-Crisis Dummy -0.193 (-1.82)* -0.198 (-1.82)*
Chaebol Dummy 0.245 (3.72)*** 0.194 (2.22)**
Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy 0.076 (0.65)
Log(Market Value) 0.018 (0.86) -0.026 (-1.16) -0.020 (-0.86)
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 21.281 (5.08)*** 14.693 (6.77)*** 20.275 (4.83)***
Forecast Horizon 0.001 (0.49) 0.001 (0.27) 0.001 (0.24)
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adjusted R2 0.0489 0.0546 0.0560
Number of Observed Firms 1312 1380 1312
Signiﬁcance Level: *5~10%, **1~5%, ***less than 1%.
Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the median analyst forecast of EPS. The difference
is deﬂated by the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms. Forecast Dispersion among analysts is the standard deviation of
analyst forecasts of EPS. The standard deviation is deﬂated by the absolute value of the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across
ﬁrms. Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of observed ﬁrm belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis:
1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period before the ﬁnancial
crisis: 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy takes a
missing value. Chaebol Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the business group, to which the ﬁrm followed by analysts
belongs, is ranked in the top 30 on a basis of total assets (the sum of total assets of afﬁliated companies belonging to the same business
groups) at the ﬁscal year-end, and 0 otherwise. Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy is deﬁned as Post-Crisis Dummy multiplied by
Chaebol Dummy. Market Value is the market value of the ﬁrms’ equity, deﬁned as the closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal
year-end multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. Standard Deviation of Stock Returns is the historical standard
deviation of daily stock returns computed over a year. Forecast Horizon is the time difference between forecast date and earnings
report date.
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7. Conclusion
Using analysts’ forecast error and forecast
dispersion for ﬁrms covered by the I/B/E/S
database, this study examines the change
in corporate transparency of Korean ﬁrms,
around the Asian ﬁnancial crisis period. We
ﬁnd the information asymmetry of Korean
ﬁrms to be lower after the Asian Financial
Crisis than before, which implies that the
transparency of Korean ﬁrms was, in effect,
improved. These changes include, but are not
limited to, reforms in government regulations.
However, since it is difﬁcult to disentangle the
effect of changes in a particular regulation
from the overall changes in an business envi-
ronment, we do not distinguish the changes in
information asymmetry due to changes in gov-
ernment regulations, from the overall changes
after the ﬁnancial crisis.
Next, we ﬁnd that chaebol ﬁrms have higher
information asymmetry than non-chaebol
ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is consistent with the view
that the internal transactions within a business
group, such as cross-subsidisations, cross-
shareholdings, and cross-loan guarantees,
are impediments to corporate transparency.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the improvement in cor-
porate transparency after the crisis, was not
higher for chaebol ﬁrms than non-chaebol
ﬁrms, despite the reforms particularly targeted
to chaebol ﬁrms such as restrictions to their
internal capital markets and improved moni-
toring. Therefore, it is concluded that chaebol
ﬁrms remained less transparent than non-
chaebol ﬁrms, even after the ﬁnancial crisis,
although chaebol ﬁrm transparency, in itself,
improved after the ﬁnancial crisis.
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Notes
1. According to Healy et al. (1995), undervalued
ﬁrms can reduce ﬁnancing costs through
voluntary disclosure activities. Nanda and
Narayanan (1997) and Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) also show that improve-
ments in disclosure and the mitigation of
information asymmetry after a spin-off can
reduce ﬁnancing costs, ultimately contributing
to increased ﬁrm value.
2. By the same token, Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) found that ﬁrms in need of
external capital show a higher propensity to
engage in spin-offs, and that they raise more
capital following a spin-off by mitigating infor-
mation symmetry. Their ﬁnding is consistentT
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Table 9: Regression results of log(forecast error) and log(forecast dispersion)
Pannel A. General Experience
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept 0.434 (0.41) 4.362 (4.04)*** 2.805 (2.36)**
Post-Crisis Dummy –0.728 (–4.19)*** –0.751 (–4.17)***
Chaebol Dummy 0.557 (5.12)*** 0.369 (2.63)***
Post-Crisis Dummy * Cheabol Dummy 0.213 (1.10)
Log(Market Value) –0.135 (–3.74)*** –0.275 (–6.97)*** –0.226 (–5.35)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 44.735 (6.29) 20.619 (5.26)*** 42.377 (5.94)***
General Experinece 0.066 (1.26) 0.073 (1.46) 0.050 (0.96)
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adiusted R2 0.0701 0.0759 0.0847
Number of Observed Firms 1009 1088 1009
Panel B. Firm-Speciﬁc Experience
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value) Coefﬁcient (t-value)
Intercept 0.477 (0.46) 4.488 (4.17)*** 2.855 (2.41)**
Post-Crisis Dummy –0.735 (–4.24)*** –0.760 (–4.23)***
Chaebol Dummy 0.557 (5.14)*** 0.365 (2.62)***
Post-Crisis Dummy * Cheabol Dummy 0.222 (1.15)
Log(Market Value) –0.137 (–3.80)*** –0.279 (–7.08)*** –0.228 (–5.42)***
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 45.195 (6.38)*** 20.853 (5.35)*** 42.718 (6.01)***
Firm-Speciﬁc Experience 0.104 (1.39) 0.085 (1.19) 0.07746 (1.04)
Industry Dummy Included Included Included
Adiusted R2 0.0705 0.0754 0.0851
Number of Observed Firms 1019 1098 1019
Signiﬁcance Level: *5~10%. **1~5%. ***less than 1%.
Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the median analyst forecast of EPS. The difference is
deﬂated by the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms. Forecast Dispersion among analysts is the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts of EPS. The standard deviation is deﬂated by the absolute value of the actual EPS to facilitate comparisons across ﬁrms.
Post-Crisis Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the year of observed ﬁrm belongs to the period after the ﬁnancial crisis: 1998, 1999,
2000, and 2001. This variable takes 0 in the case that the year of ﬁrm observation belongs to the period before the ﬁnancial crisis: 1993, 1994,
1995, and 1996. As for the observed ﬁrms in 1997, when the ﬁnancial crisis occurred, Post-Crisis Dummy takes a missing value. Chaebol
Dummy takes the value of 1 in the case that the business group, to which the ﬁrm followed by analysts belongs, is ranked in the top 30
on a basis of total assets (the sum of total assets of afﬁliated companies belonging to the same business groups) at the ﬁscal year-end, and
0 otherwise. Post-Crisis Dummy * Chaebol Dummy is deﬁned as Post-Crisis Dummy multiplied by Chaebol Dummy. Market Value is the
market value of the ﬁrms’ equity, deﬁned as the closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end multiplied by the number of
common shares outstanding. Standard Deviation of Stock Returns is the historical standard deviation of daily stock returns computed
over a year. General Experience is the median value of general experience of individual analysts who provide forecasts for a particular
ﬁrm-year. Each individual analyst’s general experience is calculated as the number of years for which a certain analyst supplied at least
one forecast for any ﬁrms before the actual earnings are released in a given year. Firm-Speciﬁc Experience is the median value of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc experience of individual analysts who provide forecasts for a particular ﬁrm-year. Each individual analysts’ ﬁrms-speciﬁc
experience is calculated as the number of years for which a certain analyst supplied at least one forecast for a particular ﬁrm before the
actual earnings are released in a given year.
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with the view that ﬁrms mitigate information
asymmetry before approaching the external
capital market in order to reduce ﬁnancing costs
and thus raise more funds.
3. Beneﬁts of enhanced disclosure include
increased investor following (Merton, 1987),
reduced estimation risk (Barry and Brown,
1985), and reduced information asymmetry
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), each of which
reduces the cost of capital. Lang and Lundholm
(1996) also suggest that increased disclosure is
associated with increases in analyst following
and forecast accuracy, as well as with reduc-
tions in forecast revision volatility and disper-
sion, which hence may reduce the cost of
capital.
4. As a result of the economic crisis, the accounted
earnings and ﬁnancial health of most Korean
ﬁrms was directly and adversely affected. Ho et
al. (2001) report that, in this period (1997–1998),
the value relevance of accounted earnings of
Korean ﬁrms signiﬁcantly declined relative to
the pre-crisis period (1995–1996). Such a decline
is also found in Mexico and Thailand when
these countries suffer from economic shocks,
such as currency devaluations (Graham et al.,
2000; Swanson et al., 2003). Consistent with Ho
et al. (2001), Graham et al. (2000) show that the
ﬁnancial turmoil surrounding the devaluation
of the baht in 1997 caused a decline in the value
relevance of Thai book values and earnings.
Similarly, with a sample of companies traded on
the Mexican Bolsa, Swanson et al. (2003) show
that the value relevance of accounting earnings
of Mexican ﬁrms is reduced by severe economic
change (i.e. Mexican currency devaluation in
1994). These prior studies focus on the effects
these economic shocks had on the value rel-
evance of accounting information during the
crisis. They do not, however, address the effects
the ﬁnancial crises had on the structural or insti-
tutional changes, after the crisis, to the informa-
tion environment in which the accounting
information is produced or distributed. Collins
and Kothari (1989) deﬁne information environ-
ment as follows: “Information environment
is deﬁned broadly to include all sources of
information relevant to assessing ﬁrm value.
It includes government reports on macro-
economic conditions, industry reports and
trade association publications, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
news in the ﬁnancial press and reports issued
by analysts and brokerage houses in addition to
accounting reports, and vertical and intra-
industry information transfers via sales and
industry reports.” Per this deﬁnition, this study
particularly focuses on the role of analyst
reports in measuring the level of information
asymmetry within a business environment.
5. In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, Korean ﬁrms
tried to restructure their inefﬁcient operating
systems. Before the ﬁnancial crisis, they had
mainly pursued external growth through the
use of debt, not through increased efﬁciency or
productivity (Chang and Hong, 2000). After the
ﬁnancial crisis, to improve their efﬁciency and
strengthen core competence, Korean ﬁrms had
to reduce much of their labor force and/or sell
off their unproﬁtable business segments. Fur-
thermore, to repay debts, they had to sell even
the proﬁtable business segments to foreign
investors. Thus, it is very likely that in the
course of selling off their businesses, Korean
ﬁrms had to post more press releases and make
more detailed information available to foreign
investors, ultimately mitigating information
asymmetry.
6. The small number of Korean ﬁrms covered
by I/B/E/S before 1993 were mainly large
conglomerates. However, after 1993, ﬁrms
included in the I/B/E/S database rapidly
increased in number. This increase in the
number of ﬁrms included in the I/B/E/S data-
base after 1993 seems to have been caused by
the partial opening of the stock market for
foreign investors in March, 1992. Foreign inves-
tor shareholding, which comprised only 3 per
cent of the total market value of the Korea Stock
Exchange at the end of 1992, increased to 8 per
cent by the end of 1993. Thus, in this study, we
restrict the sample period to 1993~2001 to
improve the comparison quality between the
pre-crisis and post-crisis period. The yearly dis-
tribution of sample ﬁrm-years is as follows:
1993(year)–280(number of ﬁrms included in the
sample), 1994–283, 1995–286, 1996–298, 1997–
305, 1998–317, 1999–335, 2000–453, 2001–451.
7. Elton et al. (1984) provide the evidence that ana-
lysts’ forecast error is a particularly appropriate
proxy for the level of information about a ﬁrm.
However, Burgstahler and Eames (1998),
Abarbanell and Lehavy (1998) and Kasznik
(1999) report that ﬁrms have incentive to
manipulate earnings to meet the forecasted
earnings of ﬁnancial analysts. Thus, low fore-
cast error may reﬂect earnings management as
well as information asymmetry, limiting the
usefulness of forecast error as a measure of
transparency. To alleviate this problem, we use
forecast dispersion as a proxy for information
asymmetry in addition to forecast error.
8. Before the actual EPS is released, analysts
usually forecast the EPS of a particular ﬁscal
year several times. The frequency of the forecast
differs depending on the analyst. I/B/E/S col-
lects the forecast data from the individual ana-
lysts around the world once a month, and with
it calculates statistics such as mean, median,
standard deviation, etc. Only the ﬁnal estimates
of the analysts are included in the monthly cal-
culation. Thus, the I/B/E/S Summary History
Tape provides calculated statistics of analysts’
forecasts of EPS once a month. In this study, we
use the ﬁnal, calculated median of an analyst’s
forecasts of EPS before the actual EPS is
released. For example, the forecast statistics of
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd, for the ﬁscal
year-end Dec. 31, 2001, were calculated once a
month from May, 2001 to March, 2002. Hence,
we use the median forecast calculated in March,
2002 as the forecast data for actual EPS in Dec.
31, 2001.
9. In PanelA, Table 1, the mean of Forecast Error is
0.5497 while the median of Forecast Error is
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0.2284. Further, the minimum and maximum
values of this variable are 0.0005 and 8.9286,
respectively. These values show that the distri-
bution of Forecast Error is skewed, and thus
log-transformation is needed for normality. On
the other hand, the mean and the median of
Log(Forecast Error) are -1.5729 and -1.4761,
respectively, showing that the distribution of
Log(Forecast Error) is closer to normality than
Forecast Error. Observations distributed in the
upper 1 per cent or lower 1 per cent were ren-
dered to have missing values, in order to mini-
mise the impact of outliers.
10. In Table 1, Panel A, the mean of Forecast Dis-
persion is 0.3941 while the median of Forecast
Dispersion is 0.2085. Further, the minimum and
maximum values of this variable are 0.0184 and
5.8483, respectively. These values show that the
distribution of Forecast Dispersion is skewed,
and thus log-transformation is needed for
normality. On the other hand, the mean and
median of Log(Forecast Dispersion) are -1.5072
and -1.5675, respectively, showing the distribu-
tion of Log(Forecast Dispersion) to be closer to
normality than Forecast Dispersion. Observa-
tions distributed in the upper 1 per cent or
lower 1 per cent were rendered to have missing
values, in order to minimise the impact of
outliers.
11. Generally, analysts afﬁliated with international
brokerage houses reside in the local country
(e.g. Korea); however, some are located in
regional headquarters (e.g. Hong Kong) or
worldwide headquarters (e.g. the USA).
12. The economic magnitude of Post-Crisis
Dummy is calculated as exp(-0.731) - 1 = -0.52
in Model 1, and as exp(–0.726) - 1 = -0.52 in
Model 3 because our dependent variable is log-
transformed.
13. We obtained the same results when we divided
the pooled sample into chaebol ﬁrms and non-
chaebol ﬁrms and then performed the regres-
sion with each sub-sample separately. These
results suggest that both chaebol ﬁrms and
non-chaebol ﬁrms experienced a decrease in
information asymmetry after the ﬁnancial
crisis.
14. The economic magnitude of Chaebol Dummy is
calculated as exp(0.507) - 1 = 0.66 in Model 2
and exp(0.384) - 1 = 0.47 in Model 3 because
our dependent variable is log-transformed.
15. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding of
Dewenter et al. (2001), which shows that the
complexity of Japanese keiretsus outweighs
their high visibility and intense scrutiny by
using the initial returns for IPOs as a measure-
ment of the uncertainty about the ﬁrms’ opera-
tions. They ﬁnd that the initial returns for IPOs
of ﬁrms related to the six largest keiretsu
groups are signiﬁcantly higher than the initial
returns for independent ﬁrms and for ﬁrms
related to vertical keiretsus.
16. The economic magnitude of Post-Crisis
Dummy is calculated as exp(-0.193) - 1 = -0.18
in Model 1 and as exp(–0.201) - 1 = -0.18 in
Model 3 because our dependent variable is
log-transformed.
17. The economic magnitude of Chaebol Dummy is
calculated as exp(0.189) - 1 = 0.28 in Model 2
and as exp(0.189) - 1 = 0.21 in Model 3 because
our dependent variable is log-transformed.
18. In this study, we deﬁne chaebol ﬁrms as ﬁrms
belonging to the top 30 chaebols. We obtain con-
sistent results when we deﬁne chaebol ﬁrms as
ﬁrms belonging to the top 10 chaebols and the
top 50 chaebols, respectively. Also, instead of
Chaebol Dummy, we use the log of the number
of afﬁliated ﬁrms to proxy for internal capital
markets and obtain similar results in Model 1
and Model 2. The only difference is in Model 3,
where the log of the number of afﬁliated ﬁrms is
not signiﬁcant while Post-Crisis Dummy is still
signiﬁcant.
19. 72 per cent is calculated as the approximation of
exp(0.541) - 1 and 66 per cent as the approxima-
tion of exp(0.508) - 1.
20. We do not perform the regression of Log(Fore-
cast Dispersion) with these two sub-samples
because Forecast Dispersion is a standard
deviation of analysts’ forecasts. Standard devia-
tion is calculated using the mean of analysts’
forecast, in which analysts’ optimism is already
adjusted.
21. We ﬁnd that the report dates contained in the
I/B/E/S database are not correct or reliable.
However, we use them in calculating Forecast
Horizon in this study because there is no other
way to get the report dates other than by this
source. Thus, because of the potential measure-
ment error in Forecast Horizon, we do not
include Forecast Horizon as a control variable
in the regression model in our main table,
Table 3.
22. To measure the forecast experience of indi-
vidual analysts, we use the I/B/E/S Detail
History Tape, because the I/B/E/S Summary
History Tape provides only the collective statis-
tics such as the mean or median of analysts’
forecasts on certain ﬁrms, not the individual
analysts’ forecast data.
23. The I/B/E/S database began to cover Korean
ﬁrms as of 1989. Thus, we do not know how
many years analysts who appear in the data set
in the initial year (1989) had forecasted prior to
the initial year (1989).
24. In addition to the individual analysts’ experi-
ence, we measure Forecast History represent-
ing how long the ﬁrm has been followed, and
examine the effect of this variable on the Log-
(Forecast Error) in the regression. However, we
do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results.
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